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Prior research indicates that altering the perspective from which a videotaped
confession is recorded influences assessments of the confession’s voluntariness.
The present study examined whether increasing decision makers’ sense of
accountabilityattenuatesthisbiasingeffectofcameraperspective.Participantsin
a high-accountability (but not a low-accountability) condition were told that they
would have to justify their judgments concerning the voluntary status of a video-
tapedconfessiontoatrialjudge.Althoughsupplementarymeasuresindicatedthat
high-accountability participants processed information contained in the video-
taped confession more carefully and thoroughly, the camera perspective bias
persisted. This result adds to a growing body of work indicating that the criminal
justice system needs to be seriously concerned with how it acquires and utilizes
videotaped confession evidence.
Confessions or other self-incriminating statements obtained during a police
interrogation are the most powerful evidence—more damning even than
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for their contributions to this project.eyewitness testimony—that can be used against a defendant in a criminal trial
(Kassin&Neumann,1997;McCormick,1972;Wigmore,1970).Littlemorethana
decade ago, confession evidence was typically introduced at trial in a written or
audiotapedformat.However,itisestimatedthatmorethanhalfoflawenforcement
agenciesintheUnitedStatesnowvideotapesomeinterrogations(Geller,1992).In
two states—Alaska and Minnesota—videotaping interrogations is required, and
Illinois is currently considering a bill to make videotaping mandatory as well. The
practice of videotaping police interrogations has many proponents in the legal
community as well as in allied fields (Cassell, 1996; Dwyer, Neufeld, & Scheck,
2000; Gudjonsson, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Leo, 1996), and it appears only a matter
oftimebeforethevideotapedformatbecomesthenormforintroducingconfession
evidenceattrial.Inlightofthesedevelopments,apossibleprejudicialaspectofthis
relativelynewtoolofthecriminaljusticesystemneedstobecarefullyscrutinized.1
In cases in which a confession is under dispute, the judge conducts a prelimi-
nary hearing to decide the issue of voluntariness and admissibility. In some juris-
dictions, confessions ruled voluntary are then introduced at trial with the other
evidencewithoutspecialinstruction.Inothers,thejudgeadditionallydirectsjurors
to draw their own conclusions concerning the question of voluntariness and to
disregard statements they deem involuntary. Those who advocate videotaping
interrogations argue that the presence of the camera will deter the use of coercive
methodstoinduceconfessionsandwillprovideacompleteandobjectiverecordof
an interrogation so that judges and jurors can evaluate thoroughly and accurately
the voluntariness and veracity of any confession. Some have even argued that
legally required Miranda warnings to suspects concerning their rights to silence
and counsel can be dispensed with if interrogations are routinely videotaped
(Cassell, 1996). In the United States and many other countries, interrogations are
typically recorded with the camera positioned behind the interrogator and focused
squarely on the suspect (Geller, 1992; Kassin, 1997). At first blush, this seems a
reasonable approach, because trial fact finders presumably need to see directly
whatthesuspectissayinganddoingtobestassessthevoluntarystatusandprobity
of his or her statements. The problem, however, is that judgments of voluntariness
are biased by the camera’s perspective.
Consistentwithearlierdemonstrationsthatobserversofaninteractionoveres-
timatethecausalroleoftheindividualwhoismostvisuallysalient(seeMcArthur,
1981, and Taylor & Fiske, 1978, for extensive reviews of this literature), we
(Lassiteretal.,inpress;Lassiter&Irvine,1986;Lassiter,Slaw,Briggs,&Scanlan,
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1Scientific evaluation of the feasibility of new technologies and techniques as potential aids in
criminaljusticeadministrationandoperationshasproventobevitallyimportant.Intheearly1980s,for
example,policeinvestigatorsturnedincreasinglytohypnosisinanattempttoenhancethememoriesof
victims and witnesses of crime (Reiser, 1980). Rigorous, systematic examination of this technique,
however, subsequently revealed that the use of hypnosis as a forensic tool was fraught with serious
problems (Dywan & Bowers, 1983; Laurence & Perry, 1983).1992) found that videotaped confessions recorded with the camera focused on the
suspect—compared to other camera points of view (e.g., focused equally on the
suspect and interrogator) or to more traditional presentation formats (i.e., tran-
scripts and audiotapes)—resulted in the judgment that the confessions were more
voluntary.Thisbiasingeffectofcameraperspectiveappearstobequiterobustand
pervasive. It influences assessments of guilt and sentencing recommendations as
well as judgments of voluntariness. It generalizes across confessions dealing with
such crimes as shoplifting, burglary, drug trafficking, rape, and manslaughter. It
affectsthejudgmentsofindividualswhoarenaturallymotivatedtobeeffortfuland
critical thinkers (i.e., those high in need for cognition; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein,
& Jarvis, 1996) as well as the judgments of individuals who lack such motivation.
Itisnotreducedbytheopportunityfordecisionmakerstodeliberatebeforerender-
ingtheirjudgments, anditpersistsevenwhenthosehavingtodecideareexplicitly
forewarned of its existence. (All of the above findings are described in Lassiter,
Geers, Munhall, Handley, & Beers, 2001.)
One criticism that could be leveled at our program of research is that partici-
pants experienced no real sense of accountability for their judgments, and it is for
this reason that they were influenced so readily by the trivial factor of camera
perspective. According to this argument, if the stakes were raised such that deci-
sion makers knew in advance that they would be held accountable for, or had
to justify, their judgments to an expert or relevant authority, they would not so
readilysuccumbtothebias.Researchinvestigatingtheeffectsofaccountabilityon
judgments does suggest that increased accountability can attenuate bias (e.g.,
Bodenhausen,Kramer,&Süsser,1994;Tetlock,1985;L.Thompson,1995).How-
ever, this literature also provides empirical examples in which accountability
amplifies bias (e.g., Gordon, Rozelle, & Baxter, 1988; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates,
1996)orhasnoeffectatallonpeople’sjudgments(e.g.,Simonson&Nye,1992).
It is assumed that people who are held accountable for their judgments gener-
ally put more effort or cognitive work into making judgments and decisions (Janis
& Mann, 1977; Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).2 As stated by Tetlock
(1983a,p.74),“peoplewhoexpecttojustifytheirviewswillbemorevigilantinfor-
mation processors—more likely to perform the difficult tasks widely regarded as
signsofhighqualitydecisionmaking(considerationofavarietyofoptionsandevi-
dence, tolerance for inconsistency, receptiveness to new evidence).” Furthermore,
it is this enhanced processing that presumably confers greater resistance to various
judgmental biases. Considerable evidence supports both these contentions (see
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, for a review). For example, high accountability has been
showntoimprovemockjurors’recalloftrialevidence,therebypreventingprimacy
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2This assumption applies to cases in which the views of the individual to whom people feel
accountablearenotknown.Whenthatindividual’sviewsareknown,peoplecansimplyshifttheirposi-
tiontomatchhisorhers,whichobviouslydoesnotinvolvemucheffortfulorcarefulthought(cf.Lerner
& Tetlock, 1999).effectsfromtaintingtheirdecisionmaking(Tetlock,1983b).Similarly,Tetlockand
Kim (1987) reported that high accountability lowered overconfidence in a predic-
tiontask.Importantly,itwasdemonstratedthatthemoreappropriatelevelsofconfi-
dencerenderedbyhigh-accountabilityparticipantsweremediatedbyanincreasein
complex thinking.
Totheextent,then,thatthecameraperspectivebiasinvideotapedconfessions
results from suboptimal processing of available information, we might expect that
increasing the accountability of decision makers will decrease the bias. However,
the fact that we (Lassiter et al., 1992) found, as noted above, no reduction in the
biasingeffectofcameraperspectiveforindividualswhoarehighinneedforcogni-
tionsuggeststhatalackofeffortful/complexthoughtmaynotbeasufficientcause
of the bias. If this is indeed the case, then heightened accountability would not
likely function as an effective debiasing factor. Because of the clear practical sig-
nificance of our prior findings for the criminal justice system, we collected data to
determine empirically what effect, if any, an increased sense of accountability
might have on individuals’ susceptibility to the camera perspective bias.
Manipulating Accountability
An examination of the relevant literature revealed that the typical manipula-
tion of accountability involves communicating to research participants—in the
case of high accountability—the expectation that they will later have to justify/
explain their judgments/decisions to one or more persons. The person or persons
to whom participants would ostensibly be accountable have included peers (e.g.,
E. P. Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, & Bargh, 1994), the experimenter
(e.g., Simonson & Nye, 1992), associates of the experimenter (e.g., Tetlock,
1983b), or other individuals described as having some expertise in the judgment
domainunderexamination(e.g.,anexecutiveboardofaninstitutionoravicepres-
identofafirm;Buchman,Tetlock,&Reed,1996;Huber&Seiser,2001).Tocreate
conditions of relatively low accountability, virtually all prior studies have simply
provided participants with the usual assurance (given in experiments) that their
responses will be kept confidential and anonymous.
Consistentwiththeseconventions,then,weledapproximatelyhalfofourpar-
ticipants to believe that they would have to explain their evaluations of the video-
taped confession to a local judge (high-accountability condition). The remaining
participants were given no such expectation; instead they were reminded that their
responseswouldnotbemadepublic(low-accountabilitycondition).Wecontacted
a fellow researcher who has recently contributed to the accountability literature
(Markman&Tetlock,2000a,2000b),andheconfirmedthatourmanipulationwas
appropriate (Keith Markman, personal communication, March 9, 2001). More-
over, in a pilot study (employing 40 Ohio University undergraduates), we found
that this manipulation was effective. That is, on (9-point) scales similar to those
used in many previous accountability studies (e.g., Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996;
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morelikelythattheywouldhavetojustifytheirreactionstothevideotapedconfes-
sion (M = 7.38) than did low-accountability participants (M = 2.42), t(39) = 9.58,
p < .0001, η2 = .71.3 Replicating effects found by Tetlock and Boettger (1994),
high-accountability participants also reported experiencing more pressure to jus-
tify the judgments they would render (M = 5.71) than did low-accountability par-
ticipants (M = 4.42), t(39) = 2.17, p = .037, η2 = .11.
Assessing the Effects of Accountability on Information Processing
Asnotedabove,thedebiasingeffectsofaccountabilityarelargelyachievedby
changes in cognitive processing. High accountability motivates individuals to
engageinmoreeffortful,extensive,andcomplexmodesofevaluatinginformation.
Forexample,Tetlockandhiscolleagueshavereportedonnumerousoccasionsthat
high accountability induces more complex thought (Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock &
Boettger,1989;Tetlock,Lerner,&Boettger,1996).Evidenceofmorevigilantpro-
cessingassociatedwithconditionsofhighaccountabilityhasalsobeenreflectedin
enhancedinformationrecall(Tetlock,1983b),greateruseoftheavailableinforma-
tion (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), and the employment of more sophisticated
covariation strategies (Murphy, 1994).
In the present experiment we measured the effect of accountability on cogni-
tive processing by assessing the amount of information participants used in reach-
ing their decisions and also by assessing how complexly they thought about that
information. The inclusion of these measures is important because they can pro-
vide further evidence that the accountability manipulation had a meaningful
impact on participants. (Recently, Mero and Motowidlo, 1995, used comparable
processing measures to establish the effectiveness of their accountability manipu-
lation.)Inaddition,shouldanyaccountability-inducedreductioninthecameraper-
spective bias occur, these measures will permit a test of whether the bias reduction
was mediated by an increase in high-effort processing.
Method
Participants
Sixty-three Ohio University undergraduates participated individually or in
small groups. In return for their participation, students received partial course
credit.
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3Eta-squared(2)isameasureofeffectsize.Cohen(1988)suggeststhat2valuesof.01,.06,and
.14 roughly indicate relatively small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively.Stimulus Materials
The stimulus materials consisted of two videotapes. The first videotape
(approximately 3 min long) depicted a judge (a retired judge from the community)
providing some guidelines concerning the determination of voluntariness (taken
fromapprovedinstructionmanualsusedbythejudiciary).Thejudge,dressedinhis
judicial robe, was shown sitting at the bench in the local courthouse. The purpose
of this videotape was threefold. First, the judge’s instruction clearly delineated the
critical judgment task facing participants. Second, this particular form of judicial
instruction has been shown to reduce, to a certain degree, the biased evaluation of
some kinds of confession evidence (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981). Finally, we
believed that allowing participants to view the judge who would ostensibly be
assessing the correctness of their judgments would add to the believability and
strength of the accountability manipulation.
The second videotape (approximately 30 min long) consisted of a re-creation
of portions of the interrogation and confession of Bradley Page, a college student,
who was convicted of the manslaughter of his romantic partner, Bibi Lee, based
largely on his disputed confession. (We are very grateful to Richard Leo for pro-
viding us with a transcript of the Page interrogation.) Many psychological and
legalexpertsviewPage’sconfessionasaninstanceofacoerced-compliantconfes-
sion (cf. Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985) and his ensuing conviction as a miscarriage
of justice (e.g., Leo & Ofshe, 1998; Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991; Wrightsman &
Kassin, 1993). Elliot Aronson, who testified at Page’s trial as an expert on
“noncoercive” persuasion, was given access to audiotapes of the interrogation and
providedthefollowingbriefaccountofwhatessentiallytranspiredwhilePagewas
in custody.
AfterinducingBradtowaivehisrightstoanattorney(“we’reallfriends,here,aren’twe?”),
the police interrogators had him go over his story several times. During the interrogation,
they kept asking him how he could possibly have left his girlfriend alone in the park and
drivenbackhome.Bradfeltterriblyguiltyaboutit,sayingseveraltimes,“Itwasthebiggest
mistake of my life!” Each time they asked the question, his guilt seemed to grow.
Finally, the interrogators told Brad that late on the night that Bibi had disappeared he had
been seen near the site of the shallow grave [where Lee’s body was recovered] and that his
fingerprints had been found on a rock that had been used as the murder weapon. Neither of
these statements was true. Brad said that he had no recollection of having left his apartment
that night and had no idea how his fingerprints could have gotten on the murder weapon (he
didn’t even know what the weapon was). But he had no reason to distrust the interrogators,
so,understandably,hebecameterriblyconfusedandaskedthemifitispossibleforaperson
to“blankitout.”Theinterrogatorsinformedhimthatsuchthingswerecommonoccurrences
and that it might help him relieve his guilty conscience if he closed his eyes and tried to
imagine how he might have killed Bibi if he had killed her. Brad proceeded to do as he was
told, inventing what he later described as an imaginative scenario. Two hours after his al-
leged confession, when he was told that the police considered it to be a confession, he
seemed genuinely astonished and immediately recanted. (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1991, pp.
175–176, emphasis in original)
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recorded simultaneously by two video cameras, each taking a different visual per-
spective. (These stimulus tapes were professionally produced with the assistance
of the telecommunications department at Ohio University.) A suspect-focus ver-
sion of the confession was made with the camera positioned so that the front of the
“suspect” from the waist up and the back of the “detective” (part of his head and
one shoulder) were visible. An equal-focus version of the confession was made
with the camera positioned so that the sides of both the suspect and detective from
the waist up could be seen equally well.
Procedure
Upon arrival participants were seated at a long table in front of a video moni-
tor. The experimenter informed participants that the purpose of the study was to
“discoverhowpeopleinrealcourtroomsmakedecisionsaboutthevalidityofcon-
fession evidence.” At this point, participants were assigned randomly to either a
low-accountability or high-accountability condition.
In the high-accountability condition, participants were told
We are also interested in whether the basis of your judgments about the confession are con-
sistent with the way judges believe jurors make decisions. A local judge, [name], has been
helpinguswiththisprojectandhasagreedtomeetwithyoutoreviewyourjudgmentsabout
the confession and to determine if the manner in which you arrived at your judgments is
correct.
The experimenter then scheduled a time for the participants to meet individually
with the judge so that they could “explain [their] decisions concerning the confes-
siontohim.”Participantsweretoldtheywouldbecompensatedmonetarilyfortheir
time (up to $50). (Participants really believed the meeting was going to take place,
as in all cases they spontaneously made a point to write down all the details of the
scheduledappointment.Furthermore,participantsweregenuinelysurprised[andin
some instances disappointed] when, at the conclusion of the experiment, they were
informed that no such meeting would take place.) In the low-accountability condi-
tion, no mention of meeting with a judge was made; instead participants were left
with the impression that their responses would be confidential and anonymous.
Allparticipantsthenviewedthepreliminaryvideotapeofthejudgeissuinghis
instruction concerning the issue of voluntariness. It was made clear to those in the
high-accountability condition that this was the same judge whom they would
ostensibly meet to justify their judgments. Next, participants were randomly
assigned to view either the suspect-focus or equal-focus version of the videotaped
confession. Following the presentation of the videotaped confession, each partici-
pant received a questionnaire and was instructed to fill it out individually. On
completion of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and dismissed.
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Embeddedwithinthequestionnairewerethreeitemsdesignedtoassesspartic-
ipants’ perceptions of the voluntariness of the confession. One item asked partici-
pants to indicate, on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all and 9 = to a large degree), “to
what degree was the confession coerced?” A second item asked participants to
indicate, on a 9-point scale (1 = given voluntarily by the suspect a n d9=coerced),
“how was the confession obtained?” The final item asked participants to indicate,
ona9-pointscale,whetherthe“suspect’sconfessionwas...”(1)givenfreelyor(9)
forced out by the detective. Participants also had to declare their judgments of
voluntariness in a dichotomous fashion. We required them to do this for three
reasons. First, in a real trial situation jurors would ultimately have to decide
whether a defendant’s statements obtained during an interrogation were voluntary
orinvoluntary.Second,therating-scalemeasuresofvoluntarinessallowedpartici-
pants a way of hedging their bets by simply choosing the midpoint of the rating
scale (a possibility that we believed might be especially likely for those in the
high-accountability condition). This option was precluded with the dichotomous
measure. Finally, previously published reports of the biasing effect of camera per-
spective have exclusively used continuous measures of perceived voluntariness
(Lassiter&Irvine,1986;Lassiteretal.,1992;Lassiteretal.,inpress).Thus,itwas
important to determine if the bias observed with rating scales can still be obtained
with less sensitive, but more ecologically valid, dichotomous measures (cf. Kerr,
1978). Participants also provided (on a 9-point scale, with higher numbers denot-
ing greater confidence) a rating of confidence in their dichotomous judgment of
voluntariness.
The final two parts of the questionnaire measured the quantity and quality of
information processing in which participants engaged. One part consisted of a sin-
gle 9-point scale on which participants indicated the amount of effort they exerted
whenarrivingatajudgmentoftheconfession’svalidity.Highernumbersindicated
greater effort. The second part comprised a more objective measure of the cogni-
tive effort expended by participants. Specifically, participants were asked to write
downwhichaspectsofthevideotapedconfessionweremostimportanttothemand
why. Participants could write as much as they wanted. Participants’ responses to
this open-ended question were subsequently coded for the number of distinct
pieces of information (i.e., particular statements or behaviors of the suspect or
detective) taken into account in reaching a decision. The coders (two members of
the research team) were blind to the experimental condition of participants. These
same coders also rated the responses in terms of how well participants developed
complex connections among the various pieces of information they had consid-
ered.Aratingof1signifiedaresponseexhibitingrelativelylittlecomplexity,arat-
ing of 2 signified a response exhibiting relatively moderate complexity, and a
rating of 3 signified a response exhibiting relatively high complexity. Interrater
agreement was substantial in both instances (rs ≥ .84).
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Processing Measures
Participants’ ratings of the amount of effort they put into arriving at a judg-
ment on the question of the confession’s voluntary status were entered into a 2
(accountabilitycondition:lowvs.high)×2(cameraperspective:suspect-focusvs.
equal-focus) analysis of variance (ANOVA). High-accountability participants
reported expending somewhat more cognitive effort (M = 6.94) than did
low-accountabilityparticipants(M=6.48),however,thedifferencewasonlymar-
ginally significant, F (1, 51) = 1.75, p < .10, one-tailed, η2 = .03.4 The main effect
of camera perspective and the two-way interaction were both nonsignificant.
The amount of information participants considered in reaching a decision (as
reflected in their open-ended responses) was subjected to the same 2× 2 ANOVA.
Thisanalysisyieldedonlyasignificantmaineffectoftheaccountabilitymanipula-
tion, F (1, 59) = 5.90, p = .02, η2 = .09. High-accountability participants identified
moreaspectsoftheconfessiontobeimportantintheirdecisionmaking(M=4.33)
than did their low-accountability counterparts (M = 2.77).
An identical analysis performed on the complexity ratings of participants’
responses also revealed a significant effect of accountability, F (1, 59) = 10.79,
p = .002, η2 = .16. High-accountability participants exhibited greater complexity
in relating the various pieces of information from the confession (M = 2.07) than
did low-accountability participants (M = 1.48). Interestingly, there was also a
significanteffectofcameraperspective,F(1,59)=5.91,p=.018,η2=.09.Partici-
pants who viewed the equal-focus version of the confession displayed more com-
plex thinking (M = 2.02) than did those who viewed the suspect-focus version
(M = 1.56). Finally, the two-way interaction was not significant, F < 1.
Taken together, these results suggest, consistent with past studies (e.g.,
Tetlock, 1983a; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995), that high accountability did prompt
participants to engage in more thorough and careful processing of the confession
evidence.
Voluntariness Judgments
Ashasbeendoneinpriorstudies(Lassiteretal.,1992;Lassiteretal.,inpress),
responses to the three scale items assessing perceived voluntariness were reversed
andsummedtoformasinglevoluntarinessindex(Cronbach’salpha=.92).Higher
valuesonthisindexcorrespondtojudgmentsofgreatervoluntariness.AnAccount-
ability Condition × Camera Perspective ANOVA performed on the voluntariness
index revealed only a significant main effect of camera perspective, F (1, 56) =
5.33, p = .025, η2 = .09. As can been seen in Table 1, the suspect-focus version of
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4 Degrees of freedom for some statistical tests are low either because some participants failed to
completeallitemsorbecausecertainitemswereinadvertentlyomittedfromthequestionnairesofsome
participants.the confession produced higher judgments of voluntariness than did the
equal-focusversion.Forthefirsttime,thisbiasingeffectofcameraperspectivewas
also shown to influence participants’ dichotomous judgments of voluntariness, z =
2.66, p < .01, h = .68.5
Confidence
Overall, participants were highly confident in their judgments of whether the
confessionwasvoluntaryorinvoluntary(M=6.81),withnosignificantdifferences
associated with camera perspective or the accountability manipulation, all Fs<1 .
Additional Analysis
Theunexpectedfindingthattheequal-focusversionoftheconfessionelicited
more complex thinking than did the suspect-focus version suggests that the effect
ofcamerafocusonvoluntarinessjudgmentsmighthavebeenmediatedbythecom-
plexityofthoughtabouttheconfession.Toexaminethispossibility,weconducted
a path analysis following procedures outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger
(1998).Regressionanalyseswereperformedtoestimatethemagnitudeandsignifi-
canceofthepathcoefficients(standardizedbetaweights).Theresultingvaluesare
presented in Figure 1.
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Table 1. Results on the Continuous and Dichotomous Measures of Judged Voluntariness
Low accountability High accountability
Measure Suspect-focus Equal-focus Suspect-focus Equal-focus
Continuous 16.63 12.50 17.87 15.20
Dichotomous .76 .43 .73 .41
Fig. 1. Path diagram and coefficients (standardized beta weights) resulting from mediation analysis.
Solid paths are significant, p < .05.
5 The index, h, measures the effect size associated with differences between proportions. Cohen
(1988)suggeststhathvaluesof.20,.50,and.80roughlyindicaterelativelysmall,medium,andlarge effectAs can be seen, the direct paths from camera perspective to complex thought
and to voluntariness judgments were both significant (ps < .05). The path from
complex thought to voluntariness judgments, however, was not significant (p =
.37).Overall,thisanalysisindicatesthatwithregardtojudgmentsofvoluntariness,
the biasing effect of camera perspective is not mediated by the complexity of par-
ticipants’ thoughts about the confession.
Discussion
The present study failed to support the idea that increased accountability
would curb the camera perspective bias in videotaped confessions. Convincing
peoplebeforehandthattheywouldhavetojustifytheirjudgments(usingamanipu-
lation consistent with previous accountability studies and one that we established
waseffectiveinpilottesting)didnotdiminishthebiasingeffectofcameraperspec-
tive.Thisnullresultobtaineddespitethefactthathigh-accountabilityparticipants,
replicatingearlierfindings(e.g.,Tetlock,1983a),didengageinmorethoroughand
complexprocessingoftheconfessionevidence—suggestingthateffortfulorcom-
plex thought is not related to the magnitude of the bias. Further evidence of this
conclusion was provided by the results of the path analysis. That is, viewing the
equal-focus version of the confession also led participants to engage in more com-
plex thinking, however, this greater complexity did not significantly alter their
voluntariness judgments. Thus, as Lerner and Tetlock (1999, p. 263) concluded,
“biascorrectionhingesnotonlyonthemotivationtocorrect,butalsoontheability
to correct one’s mental processes.” It may be the case that the camera perspective
bias in videotaped confessions, and salience effects more generally, may be espe-
cially hard to undo on account of “a lack of awareness of mental processes, the
limitations of mental control, and the difficulty of detecting bias” (Wilson &
Brekke, 1994, p. 117).6
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sizes,respectively.Separatecontrastswerealsoperformedwithineachlevelofaccountability.Thesus-
pect-focus version of the confession produced more voluntary judgments than did the equal- focus ver-
sioninboththelow-andhigh-accountabilityconditions(zs=1.94and1.82,ps<.05,one-tailed,hs=.69
and .66, respectively).
6A dilemma always arises when a variable fails to yield a significant result. Should we conclude
that accountability has no effect in the circumstances examined, or could it be the case that, despite our
argumentsandcorroboratingdatatothecontrary,wedidnotadequatelymanipulateaccountability?Al-
though we believe we created sufficiently different conditions of accountability, some readers may re-
mainunconvinced.Ifnullresultsneverseethe“lightofday,”however,thefieldendsupwithaskewed
view of the import of any psychological variable. As Lerner and Tetlock (1999, note 4) cautioned in
their comprehensive review of the accountability literature, “The publication norm of omitting null hy-
pothesis results from empirical journals limits, and perhaps biases, our sample of no-effect studies”
(emphasisadded).Itisourhopethatthepresentresearchwillbeseennotonlyasfurtheringunderstand-
ingofthecameraperspectivebiasinvideotapedconfessions,butasprovidingdatapotentiallyhelpfulin
establishing when accountability is, and is not, likely to reduce biased decision-making processes.The Camera Perspective Bias as an Instance of Mental Contamination
We believe the camera perspective bias in videotaped confessions constitutes
apowerfulexampleofwhatWilsonandBrekke(1994)describeasmentalcontam-
ination. Wilson and Brekke (1994, p. 117) define mental contamination as
the process whereby a person has an unwanted judgment, emotion, or behavior because of
mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable. By unwanted, we mean that the
person making the judgment would prefer not to be influenced in the way he or she was.
Studies conducted in our lab exploring the psychological mechanisms underlying
point-of-view/salienceeffects(Lassiter,Geers,Munhall,etal.,2001)haveyielded
findings that are in line with the above definition. That is, our results indicate that
the camera perspective bias is likely due to a basic, perceptual-level process that
people, regardless of motivation or cognitive capacity, have great difficulty over-
riding. Although Wilson and Brekke (1994, p. 134) outlined steps that could help
avoid or eliminate mental contamination (e.g., having awareness of the bias and
being motivated to correct it), they acknowledged that in some instances “[i]t can
simplybetoodifficulttoknowtheextentofthebiasandtocontrolone’sresponses
sufficiently to correct for the bias.”
Exposure Control as a Remedy for the Biasing Effect of Camera Perspective
Inlightofourpessimisticcharacterizationofthecameraperspectivebiasasan
instanceofmentalcontaminationthatinalllikelihoodcannotbereadilyundone,is
there any recommendation that we can suggest for preventing this bias from find-
ing its way into real courtrooms? Wilson and Brekke (1994, p. 134) argued that
when all else fails, “a final strategy for avoiding mental contamination is to make
surethatitneverhastheopportunitytooccurbyavoidingcontaminantsthatmight
bias one’s judgments.” Applying this strategy to the case of videotaped confes-
sions would mean not allowing suspect-focus videotaped confessions ever to be
introduced at trial.
Are we thus recommending that videotaped interrogation and confession evi-
dence not be used at all in courts of law? No, because our research program does
not paint an entirely negative picture with regard to the use of videotaped confes-
sionsinthecourtroom.AsfoundpreviouslybyLassiteretal.(1992)andLassiteret
al. (in press, Study 1), videotaped confessions that focused equally on the suspect
and the interrogator generated judgments that were comparable to those based on
more traditional presentation formats—that is, audiotapes and transcripts. Thus, it
isclearthatthevideotapingprocedureperseisnotinherentlyprejudicial.Rather,it
is the manner in which the videotaping procedure is implemented that holds the
potential for bias. It appears, then, that the advantages associated with the video-
tape method—for example, a more detailed record of the interrogation is provided
to trial participants—can be maintained without introducing bias if an equal-focus
perspective is taken by the video camera.
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videotaped confessions has already been established in New Zealand. In the early
1990s,thePoliceExecutiveCommitteeofNewZealandapprovedthevideotaping
of police interviews/interrogations on a national basis. In implementing this pol-
icy, various procedural guidelines were established. One critical issue that had to
be dealt with was where to point the camera. A letter we received from one of the
authors of “The New Zealand Video Interview Project” (Lani W. Takitimu, per-
sonal communication, November 3, 1993) informed us that
[a]fterreadingyourearlierliteratureoncameraangle,weoptedforshowingsideprofilesof
both the Police Officer and the suspect, although we knew at the time, this was different to
howtheywererecordinginterviewsinpartsofAustralia,CanadaandtheUnitedKingdom.
Thus, New Zealand made it a national policy that police interrogations be video-
taped from an equal-focus perspective based only on the first study conducted in
this research program (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986). With the greater wealth of data
thatwenowhaveonthistopic,wedonothesitatetorecommendthatasimilarpol-
icy be adopted in the United States as well as in the other aforementioned
countries.
However, as we noted in our first published paper on this topic, perhaps the
best way to videotape custodial interrogations is to position the camera so that
it records the visual perspective of the accused. “This would allow those charged
with evaluating the status of a confession the maximum opportunity to spot coer-
cive influences should they be at work” (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986, p. 275).
Although most criminal justice practitioners, and even the average person on
the street, might condemn this approach as cockeyed, its logic is borne out in
the empirical literature. Storms (1973) demonstrated that the tendency to over-
attribute another person’s behavior to internal, dispositional causes (i.e., the fun-
damental attribution error; Ross, 1977) could be corrected to some degree by
having observers view a videotape that depicted exactly what the other person
saw. Having the opportunity to literally “put yourself in another’s place” enabled
observers to better appreciate the external forces experienced by that person,
because those forces were then more “exposed” and thus more likely to be
detectedbyobservers.Consistentwiththisresult,anumberofotherstudiesfound,
using a variety of methods, that when situational factors are made especially
salient or obvious, those factors are much more likely to be taken into account in
the shaping of observers’ causal impressions (e.g., Arkin & Duval, 1975). There-
fore, those who must make policy decisions regarding the implementation of the
videotape method should not rule out the possibility of directing the camera
primarily at the interrogator(s) whom a detained suspect must face. When all is
said and done, this nonintuitive camera perspective may have the greatest poten-
tial to facilitate judges and jurors’ critical decisions regarding the voluntariness
and veracity of videotaped confessions.
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Aswithanyresearchofthiskind,therearelimitationsofthepresentinvestiga-
tion that need to be acknowledged. First, our experiment did not involve actual
confessionevidence,anactualtrial,oractualjurors.Therefore,theextenttowhich
our findings generalize to real situations can be questioned. However, concern
about this issue should be diminished to some extent by MacCoun’s (1989, p.
1046) review of a large body of mock-juror research, in which he concluded that
“mockjurorsdonotappeartoreachdecisionsbyafundamentallydifferentprocess
than actual jurors.”
Sothatparticipantscoulddevotetheirfullattentiontothequestionofthecon-
fession’s voluntary status, we excluded many factors that would be present in an
actualcriminaltrial.Forexample,therewasnoadditionalevidenceforparticipants
toconsiderotherthantheconfessionitself.Obviously,inrealtrials,factfindersare
almost always presented with other evidence in addition to the confession.
Although unlikely based on our above discussion, it is not inconceivable that the
presence of other kinds of evidence could cause a dilution of the biasing effect of
camera focus.
Also, for convenience reasons we used college students as our mock jurors.
Some investigators (e.g., Feild & Barnett, 1978; Foss, 1976) have questioned the
useofstudentsasparticipantsinjurysimulationstudies.Theresponsesofstudents,
itisargued,maybequitedifferentfromthoseofjury-eligibleadults,inwhichcase
the generalizability of the findings of studies using student mock jurors is likely to
be severely limited. Recent reviews of the mock juror/jury literature (Bornstein,
1999; MacCoun, 1989), however, indicate that the judgments of student and adult
mockjurorsarecomparable.Suchreassuringfindingsnotwithstanding,theimpact
of the present program of research on the criminal justice establishment will no
doubt be increased if it is demonstrated that the camera perspective bias in video-
taped confessions is manifested not only by students but by older, nonstudent
adults as well.
Our concern about each of the above points, however, is abated considerably
by the results of full-trial simulations we have recently conducted. In particular,
onestudy(Lassiter,Geers,Handley,Weiland,&Munhall,2001)indicatesthatthe
camera perspective bias in videotaped confessions is not eliminated even when
nonstudent adults render verdicts, when the confession is presented along with
other trial evidence (that is also in a videotaped format), and when the confession
andtrialarebasedonanactualcase(andtogetherlastapproximately3hr).Inaddi-
tion, judicial instruction, whether presented before or after the confession, had no
significant effect on the bias. The magnitude of the bias in this study was remark-
able, as the simple change from an equal-focus confession to a suspect-focus
confession doubled the conviction rate (.15 to .31)!
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In the Introduction we noted that many legal scholars, criminal justice practi-
tioners,politicalleaders,andsocialscientistshavecalledfortheuniversaladoption
of videotaping as a “quick fix” for the problem of some innocent people being
induced to incriminate themselves when confronted by standard police interroga-
tiontactics.Ourresearchindicatesthattheindiscriminateapplicationofthevideo-
taping procedure to solve the problem of coerced or false confessions slipping
through the system could potentially exacerbate an already deplorable situation.7
Aspointedoutearlier,intheUnitedStatesandinmanyothercountriesvideo-
tapedinterrogationsandconfessionsarecustomarilyrecordedwiththecameralens
zeroedinonthesuspect.Onereasonforthisparticularpositioningofthecamerais
likely the belief that a careful examination of not only suspects’ words, but also
theirlessconspicuousactionsorexpressions,willultimatelyrevealthetruthofthe
matter. As stated by Geller (1992, p. 44),
[t]he opportunity to assess a defendant’s veracity based on nonverbal cues is considered a
very substantial benefit of videotaping—indeed, it is the principal reason many urge that
criminal justice systems incur the expense of shifting from audio to video recording. As the
New South Wales Police point out, Sigmund Freud in 1905 observed the way gestures and
expressionsprovideawindowintothepsyche:“Hethathaseyestoseeandearstohearmay
convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his
fingertips, betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.”
The empirical validity of such beliefs aside,8 we have shown that, regardless
ofone’slevelofaccountability,focusingthevideocameraprimarilyonthesuspect
in an interrogation has the effect of impressing upon viewers the notion that his or
her statements are more likely freely and intentionally given and not the result of
some form of coercion. Moreover, previous studies showing judgments derived
from suspect-focus videotapes significantly deviate from judgments based on
“control” media—transcripts and audiotapes—lead to the conclusion that the
greater perception of voluntariness associated with suspect-focus videotapes is an
unmistakable bias of the most serious kind, one that runs contrary to the corner-
stone of our system of justice: the presumption of innocence. The camera may
“neverblink,”butthatdoesn’tmeanwhatit“sees”canbeconsideredanunadulter-
ated view of reality. As Susan Sontag (1977, p. 13) has so perceptively observed,
Accountability and Videotaped Confessions 67
7Leo and Ofshe (1998) reviewed 60 cases involving alleged police-induced false confessions and
concludedthatin48%ofthesecasesthefalseconfessionwasinstrumentalinproducingawrongfulcon-
viction—which in one instance, they claim, led eventually to a wrongful execution!
8Generally,peoplewithnospecialtrainingarenotespeciallygoodatdetectingdeceptionandread-
ing leaked cues (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Kraut, 1980; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal,
1981). Interestingly, a recent study (Kassin & Fong, 1999) demonstrated that individuals who were
taughttodistinguishtruthfromdeceptionbyviewingvideotapesusedtotrainpoliceinterrogators(John
E. Reid and Associates, 1991) were actually worse at accurately assessing the veracity of a “suspect’s”
statements than untrained individuals. In addition, trained individuals—despite their lower accu-
racy—were more confident that their judgments were correct!“thecamera...maypresume,intrude,trespass,distort,exploit,and,atthefarthest
reach of metaphor, assassinate.”
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